Oppenheimer

I went to see Oppenheimer yesterday. I much preferred it to Barbie! It was a very well-acted and interesting film, with layers of complexity, lots of talking points, and which is definitely worth going to see in my opinion. I saw it on an IMAX screen, which was a novelty for me, and that added to my enjoyment of the film.

I don’t know very much about Oppenheimer’s life and can’t really comment on the veracity of much of the story it told, although I guess all biographies are a matter of interpretation anyway. Despite my enjoyment here are a few more critical random thoughts:

  • The opening scenes promised a much more complex and in-depth film about the mind of Oppenheimer, and his ethical and political dilemmas, than was actually portrayed subsequently in most of the film.
  • The two court battles that take up much of the film sometimes come across as rather flat in my opinion, despite director Christopher Nolan playing around with linearity. I felt there was a lack of dramatic tension here, and in much of the first two-thirds of the film, which only really changes and develops towards the end.
  • A lot of the film was based around the intrigue and personal jealousies between Oppenheimer and Lewis Strauss, about which I knew little (and for this at least I would have liked more contextualisation early on). As it was I couldn’t help but feel the film didn’t really nail the way the American state came for Oppenheimer in the post war years, despite his heroic status as ‘father of the atom bomb’.
  • The devastating effects of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are only shown through the prism of Oppenheimer’s mind. So we only get a glimpse of the flayed skin Oppenheimer envisions in the faces of the audience at a meeting he attends. The full deadly and horrific effects of the bombings are not shown, and I thought the film was much less powerful for this omission.
  • The portrayal of women in the film is very weak. The characters and biographies of Jean Tatlock and Kitty Oppenheimer are really very interesting politically and personally – and although this is hinted at in the film, these two characters are not given the time or depth they deserve (despite being well-acted by Florence Pugh and Emily Blunt)
  • Cillian Murphy really does have the most piercingly blue eyes (at least on the IMAX screen).
  • Tom Conti as Einstein was too cartoonish to be credible.

Review of Getting Better by Michael Rosen

David Rosenberg in conversation with Michael Rosen. Stratford Old Town Hall. June 2023

I have just finished reading Michael Rosen’s book Getting Better: Life lessons in going under; getting over it and getting through it. It is an extraordinary book, which I appreciated even more having heard Michael speak about it and give a reading from it at a wonderful community event at Stratford Old Town Hall at the end of June.

When I initially saw the sub-title about ‘life lessons’ I feared Michael might be laying down tips for living a better life – echoing the kind of ‘positivity’ mantra that follows the ‘always look on the bright side’ of life from people who you feel might have experienced very few dark sides. Michael does give ‘life tips’ in this book, but he does so in a way that is far from the false positivity and manufactured hope of some ‘self-help’ books. This is non-prescriptive writing, which always recognises that many of us are just not in a position economically, socially or psychologically to follow such advice.  

This is a book that is rich with Michael’s own experience of illness, of grief, of feelings of failure and full of exploration about the ways he has been able to cope with his feelings and to live through and beyond them. Here are stories from Michael’s own childhood, his relationships with his parents, the ‘family secret’ of the dead brother that no-one talked about and of discovering the history of his family members in the Holocaust.

The book also describes Michael’s own experiences with illness and death – his 12 years of suffering undiagnosed with hypothyroidism, the death of his son Eddie when just nearly 19, and Michael’s subsequent experience of grief, and his own near-death experience with Covid – spending 40 days and nights in a coma at the start of the pandemic, being cared for by NHS nurses and doctors.

Resonances

Everyone will take their own unique ‘lessons’ from this book, and relate Michael’s life experiences to different areas of their own life. For me, the following three ‘lessons’ (if you want to call them that – I would prefer ‘resonances’ I think) felt particularly apt.

Firstly, Michael’s experience living with the undiagnosed symptoms of hypothyroidism struck a real chord of recognition with me. He spent 12 long years feeling like a ‘blob’, suffering a range of disparate symptoms from his underactive thyroid gland – including slurred speech, puffed up features, clammy skin, not being able to hold himself or walk properly or even to focus and think sharply. Once diagnosed, he felt a deep sadness at what had happened to him and his life as ‘my list of disconnected symptoms collapsed into one case: me.’  Once put on suitable drugs, it was as if he had come alive and yet he still had to reckon with what he might have done and who he could have been if he hadn’t been through those untreated years; life had been pre-Blob, Blob, and post-Blob. How could the strands of this life be knitted together, and was the person he had been and who he became all the Blob’s fault, or was that just a convenient excuse?

These feelings so resonated with me due to my own belated diagnosis of an illness of another endocrine gland, the pituitary. I spent around six years with an undiagnosed macro-prolactinoma, a benign tumour on the pituitary gland that caused excessive secretion of the hormone prolactin (usually only secreted to produce breast milk) and which eventually grew over my optic nerves, causing me to have tunnel and dimmed vision, so I could no longer see to read or go about my daily life. Like Michael, before diagnosis I suffered a range of disparate symptoms, which for me included gaining a huge amount of weight (without over-eating), experiencing severe and debilitating headaches, feeling extremely fatigued, losing all interest in sex, my periods becoming very irregular and then stopping altogether… and then the gradual loss of sight, which eventually led to me being rushed into hospital as an emergency, with doctors fearing permanent loss of my sight. Similarly to Michael, once I was diagnosed and treated I had to come to terms with so many areas of my life that had been altered by my illness, and to grapple with exactly what aspects of my life had been due to the tumour, what may have happened anyway, and had the tumour just been a convenient excuse for what I’ve perceived as so many failures in my life. This has remained a constant question for me, as although my sight returned many of the symptoms remained (plus some other ones caused by the drug I took to treat the tumour).

Secondly, I learned that I should use olive oil on my ingrowing toenails – a lesson taught to Michael by a podiatrist after his toenails (which had dropped off when he was in hospital with Covid) started growing back into his skin.

Writing through it

Thirdly, the way Michael explains how it has always helped him to feel better about his feelings and experiences if he writes about them really struck a chord with me. In his chapter, ‘Words’, he provides a wonderful exploration of just what words, and playing with words and sentences, can do for the person writing them – even if no-one else sees them. Writing can ‘objectivise experience’, it can provide distance or a different angle and perspective. ‘This kind of writing and thinking can take the edge off pain,’ he writes. ‘It can take us away from that desperate, nowhere-to-go, living-in-hell feeling and transport us for a while into something much calmer, cooler, more detached.’

I have often felt like this about writing. I do not mean the writing I do for public consumption or publication, nor the writing for academic essays or my PhD thesis – that kind of writing can be quite tortuous for me. I mean writing for myself – in the diaries and journals I have kept since I was 17 with their ‘stream of consciousness’ about aspects of my life. This would seem like meaningless drivel to an external reader, and sometimes does to myself on the few occasions I’ve re-read my journals. Rather what is important is the process of writing things down, of working things through in your mind, of somehow externalising it, which is what feels so valuable. I would urge anyone who wants to read about writing your way through difficult feelings, trauma and grief to take a look at Michael’s chapter.

Of course if you do share your writing with a friend or family member, or if you write for publication, there is something else going on too. As Michael writes, this makes writing different from just talking things through with someone – ‘you are sharing something you’ve unfolded on to a page, making it into a shape. It’s you, but in a way it’s not you, because now it’s out there, separate from you.’

I am profoundly grateful to Michael for putting his thoughts and emotions ‘out there’ so that we too can find our own meanings in his words and the ways they might resonate with our own lives.

Michael Rosen, Getting Better: life lessons on going under, getting over it, and getting through it, (London, Ebury Press, 2023).

A portrait of my dad: Ronald Croft

My Dad, Ronald Croft, was born on 24 April 1928 in Stockton on Tees, County Durham. He was the son of Florence Croft, who was an 18 year old single mother, at a time when young women who had ‘bastard’ children were too often incarcerated in institutions. Florence stayed with her family, but Dad grew up with the lie that Florence was his sister and that his grandparents, Fred and Elizabeth, were his parents.

It wasn’t until he was 11 in 1939, and his grandparents both died within months of each other, that he found out Florence was his Mum. I was also 11 when I found out about his history when I had to do a ‘family history’ project at school. Dad gave me a list of his ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’ – Mary, Grace, Tom, Beatty, Harold, Emily, Ivy, Freda and Florence – and then suddenly revealed, ‘well, they were my aunts and uncles really, and Florence was my Mum’. He never knew who his father was.

My only record of his early life was the story he told my for my family history, which as I wrote it reads a bit like a Hovis advert:

He remembered his first day at Norton Infant School when he was five years old, and there was a shelf the children put their lunches on. At the bottom of the small hall there was a police station. Times were quite hard when my father was a boy in County Durham. His family worked hard, trying to make ends meet. Most things were homemade, like meals and clothes. At the junior school they did a lot of basket weaving. At nights, their entertainment was having a good sing-song around the piano and making peg-mats and basket weaving. The community was very closely knit, as people were friendly and helped each other out much more, but this was because they were very hard times then.’

That’s it. A stripped down, sanitised snippet of my Dad’s memories, mediated by my 11 year-old self, careful of what went into my school project.

Early life

I have my own memories, of course, and other things I found out about his life, mainly through my Mum. Florence got married and had four other children, and my Dad went to live with them in Enfield, north London, immediately after his grandparents died. But his step-father rejected him and made his life very difficult (shame/scandal/’not his blood’). Dad was evacuated to Harpenden during the war, living with a foster family who he described as ‘cruel’. I remember his tales of how he was made to get up at 5 in the morning to light all the fires, and was given all the heavy household tasks to do.

The picture above shows Dad when he was aged 16, sitting in one of the village greens in Harpenden. Dad left school when he was 14 in 1942 and started a series of unskilled factory jobs, which he would do for the rest of his life, except for the brief period he did National Service at the end if the war in 1946. When he was 15 he had a big row with the father of the family and run away, sleeping on park benches and living rough for a few weeks. Eventually, his friend Bob Rolt persuaded his family to take him in, and he lived with them for several years, as his mother and step father refused to let him come back ‘home’. His ‘new’ family, the Rolts, had their own troubles. Bob’s sister, Beryl, was raped when she was 16, suffered a nervous breakdown, psychiatric hospitals, shock treatment, drugs. I remember Dad saying that ‘they all blamed her’ for what had happened.

Dad used to often tell the story of a trip to France in the 1950s, his only holiday abroad. See the picture below. He and the group of friends he was holidaying with walked out of a bar because the bar tender had refused to serve their friend who was black. He was so proud of this story, and used to repeat it every time he had had a few drinks – despite at the same time holding some pretty backward views on race.

Dad in a bar in France 1950s. He is the unsmiling one on the right

Part of the union

He spent most of his working life as an unskilled worker in the packing/finishing section at the Skefco Ball-bearing factory in Luton. He was a proud ‘union man’, at various times shop steward and joint convenor of the AUEW, and helped to lead various disputes, including a long-running one over equal pay in the early to mid-1970s. He never stopped talking about the union at the tea table at home, and his union talk formed a verbal backdrop to my years growing up. He used to proudly sing the Strawbs’ ‘Part of the Union’, not knowing that it had originally been written as an anti-union song. Later, when I became active in socialist politics, I felt like I had absorbed all his union talk, that it had become embedded in my psyche. He was much more right wing than I would become. He was a fan of Harold Wilson and Barbara Castle, and thought Tony Benn (even in the mid-1970s) was too left wing.

He was also a very flawed character personally, and like most of us a bundle of contradictions. He saw himself as an anti-racist, cheered on the first big ANL carnival (on the TV news – he had stopped me from going) and yet used the foul racist language of the 70s. He fought for equal pay, and yet treated my Mum like a skivvy. Whenever I think of him I can see him sitting in the armchair, drinking endless cups of tea with a packet of 20 Piccadilly Tips by his side and barking out orders to my Mum to fetch this and fetch that. He was an argumentative character (a trait I developed myself) and I remember the year leading up to his death in 1978, when I had got into punk and rebellion, as being one of endless slagging matches with him. He didn’t hit me often but there was one time I will never forget when he totally lost it and lashed out at me. The Goodies was on the TV, and for years I had recurring nightmares of him slapping me over and over while that inane theme tune ‘Goody Goody yum yum’ played in the background.

I mostly remember him fondly these days, and have usually posted positive recollections on social media on his birthday, the anniversary of his death and fathers’ day. But family life is rarely an uncomplicated or wholly positive experience, and my memories are both good and bad. His death from stomach cancer – his body ‘riddled with cancer’ according to his death certificate – had a profound effect on me. My last memory of him was visiting him in intensive care at St. Albans Hospital. It was a shock to see him lying there inert, his body pale and flabby, connected to a ventilator and hard clumps of dried blood around his lips. Dad, who had been so animated – laughing, shouting, scowling, grimacing. I recoiled from touching him, which I regret. I had defied the nurses who had thought it would be too upsetting for me to see him. I will always be glad I defied their wishes. I knew it would be the last time I saw him. But I wished I had flung my arms around him, told him I loved him, said I was sorry for being such a contrary and argumentative daughter. But I was silent, and only kissed him in my mind’s eye. I have often thought of trying to trace his family background – I never met any of his family – and to tell his story properly, without frills, just like he always tried to tell things ‘as they were’ and I really hope to one day.

Dad in 1950s, nurturing a pint

Review of This Mortal Coil by Fay Bound Alberti

This review was first published in October 2016 on the BMJ Medical Humanities blog here

Fay Bound Alberti, This Mortal Coil: the human body in history and culture, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016)

We all have stories to tell about our bodies. They are, as Fay Bound Alberti writes, ‘the inescapable material reality we live with and in.’ In today’s scientific and medical world, however, our bodies are often viewed as a series of parts to be examined rather than an interconnected whole. In This Mortal Coil, Alberti explores the history of how and why we came to see our bodies as an assemblage of parts to be scrutinised, assessed and treated. Reading this book, I was reminded of my own story of how I came to be diagnosed with a large, benign tumour on my pituitary gland. I spent over two years seeking treatment from my GP and optician for what seemed to me to be a variety of unconnected symptoms. Finally, during an emergency visit to hospital when my eyesight failed, one doctor asked me to describe everything I could remember about changes in my life and body in recent years. It was only when I recounted my seemingly disparate symptoms of gaining weight, frequent headaches, feeling anxious, irregular periods and failing eyesight as one narrative story that the doctors were able to make a diagnosis. Such a holistic approach is all too rare in the context of today’s highly specialised, and often under-resourced, medical services, however. As Alberti highlights, ‘Today’s government funding, research, building, and personnel resources form separate systems to deal with mental health (psychiatry and psychology), the heart (cardiology), the brain (neuroscience), the skin (dermatology), the gut (gastroenterology), and so on.’

In This Mortal Coil, Alberti features a series of historical case studies to examine how we came to view the body, and its ailments and injuries, in this compartmentalised way. She starts with the moving story of her teenage daughter Millie’s diagnosis with scoliosis, a severe curvature of the spine, which has caused her great discomfort and pain. Millie has had to endure endless surgery to try to straighten her spine, including the insertion of metal rods into her back, causing Alberti to ask, ‘At what point do the rods and screws become part of her “real” body?’ Millie’s spine was treated as a discrete object to be assessed and treated, disconnected from her emotions about her spine and her anxieties about her body image. Millie’s story foregrounds some of the major themes of the book – the separation between the body and the mind, and the ruptures between our sense of self and our bodily organs. As Alberti writes, ‘In modern health care our ability to treat the spine as a part we can repair, like the heart, like a limb, necessarily displaces our “self” from the body part in question.’

In the ensuing chapters, Alberti takes us on a fascinating voyage through the body and its parts examining the history of the skeleton, heart, brain and stomach, and the less charted territory of the breasts and genitals, the skin and the tongue. In each case, Alberti shows how changes in medical knowledge, and in the language and metaphors we use to explain and describe our bodies, have transformed the way we have experienced, lived within and felt about our bodies. This journey takes us through political, medical and philosophical developments that transformed our understanding of the body as being controlled by the balance of the four humours, to the brain-centred understanding we have of the body today. Moreover, these changes in the conceptualisation of the body and its organs have always been inflected with historically-specific gendered and racialized assumptions about human behaviour and emotions. Taking an explicitly feminist perspective throughout, Alberti explores how differences between the sexes were naturalised and encoded in scientific and medical texts. She looks, for example, at how the bones were gendered by the scientific classifications of the structure and shape of the male and female skeleton. The assumption that women will have smaller skeletons, developed in the 18th and 19th centuries, has meant that even today physically large women, or conversely physically small men, have not been recognised in archaeological surveys of human remains.

Such gendered explanations come to the fore in the chapters where Alberti focuses on the history of female bodies, and how scientific and medical ideas about female and male bodies have naturalised inequality between men and women. I found the chapters on the history of the breast and female sexual organs to be some of the most compelling and original in the book. In her chapter on female genitalia, for example, Alberti traces the often overlooked history of the vagina, the vulva, the hymen and the clitoris. She shows how the vagina has often been viewed and represented, in both medical and cultural texts, by the absence of a penis, a ‘no thing’, as it is described in the slang Shakespeare deploys in Hamlet. Even today, Alberti argues, dictionary definitions seldom describe the vagina as a sexual organ in and of itself, but rather as a canal or a passage, leading to elsewhere – its purpose presumably to gratify the male penetrator. Female sexual organs have historically been very sketchily represented in medical textbooks. This is particularly the case with the clitoris, the one human organ designed solely to provide pleasure, which remains the most under-researched and under-represented organ of the female body. As Alberti writes, the clitoris ‘symbolises historically persistent fears about female sexuality: disorderly, uncontrollable, and independent, a force for agency above and beyond its medico-scientific and social framework’. In contrast, the far less biologically complex flap of skin in the vagina, the hymen, has been invested with undue medical and cultural significance, repeatedly referred to as literal and figurative ‘evidence’ of a woman’s virginity and purity.

Alberti also traces how absence of body hair has come to be seen as an ideal of feminine beauty in Westernised societies. How did we get to a place, Alberti asks, ‘where the almost complete removal of public hair, a process that is painful, inconvenient, expensive, and repetitive, is not only fashionable but also the idealised “norm”, female body hair being seen, at least in most of Europe and the United States as unattractive, unfeminine, and even dirty?’ Here she pinpoints how excessive body hair on women became pathologized in the 19th century, particularly with the development of evolutionary theory whereby excessive body hair became associated with being animal-like and primitive. In the case of Julia Patrana, a black woman with excessive body hair who was exhibited across Europe in a touring ‘human zoo’ in the 1850s and 1860s, we see how gendered and racialized prejudices intersected in medical and popular representations about the black, female body.

Alberti even devotes a chapter to the gendered history of the tongue, exploring how the tongue has been a powerful metaphor confirming women as lesser beings than men. If I had previously considered the tongue as a biological entity, it had been as a rather innocuous organ that enabled us to speak and communicate. Although technically the tongue is sexless and without individual agency, Alberti argues that its history is ‘rife with social, sexual, psychological, linguistic, and physiological significance.’ The tongue, like all organs of the body, cannot be separated by the gendered linguistic metaphors that have been used to describe it. Female tongues have historically been seen as untrustworthy and as a threat to social order. In early modern Britain, the 17th and 18thcenturies, for example, women were frequently characterised as having ‘vexatious’, ‘sharp’ or ‘scolding’ tongues – as illustrated by the character of Katherine, the ‘nag’ in Shakespeare’s Taming of the Shrew. By the 18thcentury, women’s tongues were said to drive men to violence, and an ‘evil tongue’ was enough to exonerate a man from beating, and even murdering, his wife. Cruel punishments were devised to keep women’s tongues under control – including the ‘scold’s bridle’, a metal contraption that was strapped to the woman’s head to prevent her from speaking.

Although Alberti analyses the organs of the body in separate chapters, she skilfully subverts the view of the body as an assemblage of disparate parts. By taking the body apart, she writes, we might even be able to reconstruct it anew. She concludes the book with a call for a holistic approach to the body and its ailments, one that views the body as more than the sum of its parts. My fear is that this holistic approach is out of sync with the current direction of medical thought and practice in a neoliberal capitalist economy, where medical research and treatment is dominated by competing specialisms and by giant pharmaceutical companies, which seem to be ever more voraciously targeting their wares on specific bodily organs and diseases in the race to maximise profits. As Alberti remarks in her conclusion, although the body represents the limits of our sense of self, the skin marking the boundary between ourselves and the world, we are not self-contained beings, separate from the social and political environments we inhabit. Rather, writes Alberti, we are ‘social beings that communicate with others – not only through tongues as symbols and organs, but through social practices, behaviours and our very materiality.’  It would be interesting to explore further the ways in which social structures and practices, such as the dominance of work in our daily lives and constraints on time and leisure, have altered our bodies and the way we think, feel and talk about them.

In This Mortal Coil, Alberti has provided a compelling history, which explores the relationship between the biological body, with its bones, skin, guts and genitals, and the language and metaphors we use to describe it, without reducing one to the other. Written accessibly, and in beautiful prose, this book will appeal to historians, social scientists, medical professionals and the general reader alike. Highly recommended.

Some thoughts about #Metoo 

I wrote this in October 2017 as a first response to the #Metoo status:

1. I put my own #Metoo status on my Facebook page. I didn’t spell out the details of the sexual assault I experienced when I was aged 18 or details of the other countless times I have experienced more ‘minor’ incidences of sexual violence and harassment. Indeed, that I have labelled more everyday sexual violence and harassment as ‘minor’ is part of what the #Metoo campaign has highlighted through naming and recognising how sexual violence has become so normalised it has previously been not been felt to be worthy of comment.  If writing #Metoo statuses on social media has made women feel slightly more in control, to feel we are not just victims, that we are not on our own, that this is not an individualised problem, or to do with our own perceived failings, then it has been worth it.  This is not about victimhood but about agency. It is about asserting a message that violence against women is widespread, is normalised and is not acceptable. This is not in any way to say that those who have experienced sexual violence should post about it. Some women will feel too traumatised by their experiences; will not want to risk reliving those experiences; may not have told friends and family; and may just want everyone else to mind their own business. So it is brilliant that women are speaking out, but the onus should not be on women to speak out; it is not our “duty” or responsibility to raise the issue; it’s men’s duty to recognise their abusive behaviour and to do something about it.

2. What about sexual violence against men? I’ve seen this argument on some friends’ posts. Sexual assault against men and boys is a reality and should be condemned just as vociferously as violence against women. But let’s also have a sense of perspective here. The majority of sexual violence is committed against women and girls (cis, non-binary and trans) and is perpetrated by men. Highlighting why such violence against women is a problem of such enormity, and why it so often takes the form of sexual violence, is not to deny the abuse and rape of men – it is to begin to grasp and ask questions about the ways in which sexual violence is gendered, and how and why sexual violence against women is so prevalent, why it is mainly committed by men against women. It’s good if men speak out against sexual violence perpetrated against them, but I do worry that in the current context – of so many women, some for the first time, openly admitting they are survivors of sexual harassment and violence – that insisting ‘it’s not only women’ can feel like it’s trying to silence the voices of women (silent for too long) speaking out against the widespread and normalised everyday sexual violence that pervades our lives.

3. Do I think that such a social media campaign will change anything? Well perhaps not much in the bigger run of things. Violence against women isn’t an individual problem of a few badly behaved men. It is a systemic problem, which is central to, and structured into, the whole way capitalist society and its gendered order is organised. Violence against women is not an aberration, nor is it just a reflection of an unequal society – it is central tenet of the way the patriarchal capitalist system works, and sexual violence itself works to create and perpetuate further gendered inequalities and sexual injustice, and is enmeshed in structures of class and race and power that run throughout society. Violence against women is not only committed by rich, powerful men but also by poor and working class men. Moreover, sexual violence and its repercussions are embedded in our lives, livelihoods, bodies and emotions. So no, a Facebook or Twitter post won’t do anything much by itself. But if it makes one woman feel less alone; less victimised; feel she has more of a voice and more agency, and if more people start discussing sexual violence more openly, if it helps to break some of the silences, then it not only has been worth it but perhaps could be the small beginnings of a more powerful movement for wider systemic and structural change.

The Politics of Mental Health

This is an article I wrote in June 2017. It was first published in the magazine of Revolutionary Socialism in the 21st Century (rs21) and on the rs21 website here: Politics of Mental Health

Mental health has become a huge issue in the media in recent months – with Theresa May unable to escape questions about it during the election, and with Prince Harry and a host of celebrities launching campaigns to address the stigma still attached to those experiencing mental health problems. The more mental health gets spoken about openly, and the more we can reduce stigma, can only be a positive step. But reducing stigma is not enough on its own.

‘They almost always ask what is wrong with you and hardly ever ask what happened to you.’

These words of mental health activist Eleanor Longden sum up current approaches to mental health. The mainstream narrative – from the government, psychiatrists, health care professionals and the media – is dominated by explanations that locate mental ill-health as being a ‘problem’ within the individual. Mental health is nearly always couched in individualised terms about what is damaged, lacking or inadequate about a person’s behaviour and feelings. There is far less discussion of what has happened to those experiencing mental health problems – what is their housing like, how is their work organised, what abuse have they suffered, how has poverty, racism and sexism affected their mental wellbeing?

To take just one example, think of the stress and anxiety that living in the private rental sector has on someone’s mental health – anxiety about paying rent, short term tenancies forcing you to constantly have to move, cramped and inadequate conditions, and the constant insecurity caused by fear of eviction. We are living in what some have characterised as a mental health crisis – where stress and anxiety from insecure living conditions, badly paid and often precarious jobs, a vicious benefits regime and the wider effects of austerity are causing suicide rates to rise, and more and more people to be diagnosed as having depression, anxiety disorders, personality disorders and other mental health problems. At the same time, mental health services have been slashed and all too often fail to provide the support that people need. An estimated three-quarters of those with an ongoing mental health problem, for example, receive no psychiatric help or support, and one quarter of those with serious mental health diagnoses are said to be at serious risk of self-neglect due to inadequate care and support being available. In this article, I want to explore some ideas about psychiatry and mental health today, and to look at what has happened to understandings, diagnosis and treatment of mental health.

Psychiatry under neoliberal capitalism

The biomedical model of psychiatric diagnosis and practice has become ever more dominant over the past 40 years. Mental illness, although still not funded and treated on a par with physical ill-health, is overwhelmingly conceptualised by psychiatrists, in the media, and by many service-users, as being a problem, fault or disease located in the body, most usually in a  person’s genetic make-up or brain chemistry.

Of course biological explanations for mental illness are not new, although scientific justifications have changed. Ever since the mid-19th century, doctors and psychiatrists have been obsessed with finding a physical cause for mental illness – from the 19th century obsession with finding a lesion in the brain, including dissecting the dead bodies of those deemed insane, to theories in the early 20th century about toxins and bodily infections as being the prime cause of mental illness to recent theorisations about chemical imbalances in the brain, such as too much dopamine causing schizophrenia. Through the 20th century a plethora of often barbaric physical treatments were deployed to ‘treat’ mental illness, including leucotomies, which involved carving out chunks of the brain, to inducing Comas through insulin injections and the development of Electro Convulsive Treatment (ECT). Since the development of the mass production of anti-psychotics and anti-depressants in the 1950s, drug treatments have replaced most of these cruder experimentations on the bodies of those diagnosed with mental illness – although ECT continues today, and its use has reportedly significantly increased over the past ten years. Despite all the brain research, physical experimentation and the widespread use of drugs, no definitive biological causes or explanations have been found for the cause of mental illness.

Nevertheless, over the last four decades the biomedical model has undergone a resurgence, dominating all research into mental illness, to the detriment of research exploring psychological, social and structural factors in the development of mental distress. How can we explain this continued dominance of biological theories and treatment? Here the influence of the pharmaceutical industry on governments and the psychiatric profession cannot be underestimated. Big Pharma has a huge investment in psychiatry, using its multi-billions to exert influence on how various behaviours and emotions are defined and classified as distinct conditions for which they can then sell medication. As David Healy has written of the marketing tactics of the big pharmaceuticals, ‘they now sell diseases rather than just drugs.’

At the same time as the big multinational drug firms have built their markets in psychiatric drugs, psychiatric services have been decimated in an era of spending cuts and austerity. The 1970s and 1980s saw the closure of the big mental hospitals, which were shut down and the property, usually on lucrative sites, was sold off to the highest bidder. At Napsbury Hospital, where I worked in the early 1980s, swanky flats worth millions now occupy the spaces once the home to long-term patients. Many of us welcomed the closure of these vast institutions, and hated their association with the oppressive asylum system of the Victorian era which locked people away, out of public view. But the much lauded ‘community care’ that was supposed to replace them remained woefully underfunded, and in many cases, non-existent. Day centres have also since been closed, and those needing care and support are often left alone in substandard accommodation, often grotty bedsits, forced to rely on medication and only able to access any help at times of acute crisis.  Although psychiatric drugs can be a live saver, providing people with relief from their symptoms, those who take psychotropic and other psychiatric drugs on a long term basis often suffer from debilitating side effects, such as nausea, lack of libido, weight gain, insomnia, fatigue, and hallucinations.

As the effects of mental health cutbacks have hit harder, the government has increasingly deployed coercive measures to be been seen to be reducing risk of harm, such as the introduction of Compulsory Treatment Orders and the widespread introduction of the ‘recovery model’, which many mental health campaigners and service user groups have viewed as an insidious neoliberal tool of coercion. The group Recovery in the Bin, for example, write: ‘Many of us will never be able to “recover” living under these intolerable social and economic circumstances, such as poor housing, poverty, stigma, racism, sexism, unreasonable work expectations, and countless other barriers.’

The ‘pathologisation’ of everyday life

Since the early 1990s psychiatric drugs have also been prescribed far more widely outside of psychiatric institutions. Today some 90 per cent of those who come into contact with psychiatric services outside of hospital are prescribed some form of psychiatric drug. Take the example of Prozac, which was first introduced in 1987 and quickly became the fastest selling psychiatric drug in history. Prozac has been prescribed more often than any other drug, and became a household name and the topic of best-selling books. It was marketed on the idea it could not only control people’s depressive symptoms but would make people feel ‘better than well’. The drug companies prey on the real stresses and insecurities that people feel in order to sell them back a ‘solution’ in the form of a pill.

The dominance of Big Pharma also helps to explain the proliferation of new psychiatric disorders over the past four decades. More and more areas of life, often previously viewed as having social roots rather than medical ones, have been pathologised and treated as an illness which requires medication. To highlight the ways that new psychiatric disorders have been created is not to suggest that all diagnosis is a myth or should be rejected.  Many people experiencing mental health problems welcome a diagnosis because it helps give meaning to the way they are feeling or to what can be experienced as frightening symptoms, such as hearing voices. In this society diagnosis also gives people access to help, treatment, and support, however inadequate. It was the struggles of Vietnam Veterans for recognition, compensation and support for their traumatic symptoms following the Vietnam War, for example, that led to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) being recognised as an official diagnosis in 1981. Continued cuts to health funding, however, mean that the way a diagnosis like PTSD is understood and applied, can also be used to limit and/or deny the types of treatment available, despite its origins in the struggle of Vietnam veterans.

Under the current neoliberal order, our mental health is subordinated to the needs of the market. On the one hand, the government and big business sell us the idea of happiness and wellbeing, a kind of consumerist dream where we seek our personal fulfilment through a well-paid job and a happy relationship, furnished with consumer goods as markers of our success. On the other hand, when the capitalist system fails to deliver on our dreams and goals, we are encouraged to blame ourselves for our failure to succeed. But if we begin to crack psychologically, then we find there are few psychological services available to help.

Psychotherapeutic services, counselling, and other ‘talking therapies’  are harder than ever to access, particularly if you are poor or marginalised. Moreover, what is on offer are services that increasingly provide a version of the insidious message of the ‘happiness industry’ that we ourselves are ultimately responsible for our own mental wellbeing. Those seeking help through the NHS are mainly offered Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT), which is offered on a time limited basis, sometimes through online programmes, or Mindfulness programmes, again often provided through online programmes.  These services can be very helpful for some people, and should be more widely and extensively available. But CBT and mindfulness are not necessarily suited for everyone or applicable to coping with every mental health issue.  Such therapies focus on helping people to change their behaviour or patterns of thinking to cope better with everyday life and do not address the underlying causes of mental distress, which might be better helped through longer-term in-depth psychotherapy or open-ended counselling, for example. Nor do they deal with the economic, social and political restraints, such as job insecurity or inadequate housing, which have caused or exacerbated the person’s mental health difficulties in the first place.

A Social Framework

Although written before the full effects of neoliberal policies on psychiatric practice and diagnosis, the work of Marxist writer Peter Sedgwick provides a useful social framework to explore mental health under neoliberal capitalism. In his 1982 book Psychopolitics, and in several articles written in the 1970s, Sedgwick conceptualised mental illness as being both real and constructed. His book was a critique of anti-psychiatrists, such as RD Laing and Thomas Szasz, who had argued that psychiatry was a tool of oppression.  Sedgwick agreed with the anti-psychiatrists that diagnosis and treatment were not value-neutral but were laden with judgements about what was considered ‘normal’ behaviour. But physical illnesses were also socially constructed, Sedgwick argued. Most anti-psychiatrist thinkers had an individualist critique of psychiatry, which construed the problem as one of the behaviour of psychiatrists. But for Sedgwick psychiatry could not be viewed as a battle between oppressive psychiatrist and the patient labelled as mentally ill.  We needed to look at the wider social context in which mental illness developed and psychiatric diagnosis took place. Mental health was part of a social process, and linked to wider social and political interests and struggles.

Such a social framework provides a way in which we can connect an individual’s psychological feelings to the relationships and structures of society. In this way, we can begin to focus on the question of what has happened to us in our lives, rather than to focusing on what is wrong with us. Mental health is not disconnected from wider social relationships of exploitation and oppression, but is enmeshed in them. We can see this in the way that mental health, and its treatment, is gendered and racialized. Women, people from ethnic minorities and those who are LGBTQ are all more likely to suffer symptoms of mental distress and to face mental health problems.  A recent study, for example, found that people from ethnic minorities in Britain were five times more likely to suffer from psychotic disorders, with first generation migrants who arrived in Britain as children most at risk. The researchers identified factors such as racist discrimination, a sense of belonging, perceived threats and the conflicting demands of living in a new country as factors in the development of psychotic episodes.

At the same time, racism, sexism, homophobia and transphobia within the psychiatric system mean that people from oppressed groups are more likely to be diagnosed with mental illness and to be categorised according to wider assumptions about gender, race or sexuality. Whereas men as more likely to be diagnosed with anti-social personality disorders, over 70 per cent of those diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) are women, many of whom have suffered childhood physical or sexual abuse.  Those diagnosed with BPD (sometimes called Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder) are often characterised as being ‘difficult’ and manipulative patients, always trying to catch out the psychiatrist or clinician. Her words and actions are then interpreted in ways that fit in with gendered assumptions about women with BPD, and she is viewed as being too argumentative, too needy, too clever and too sexual.  As feminist critics of BPD have pointed out, the diagnosis detracts from the important of childhood abuse in the development of trauma and mental illness. In this way, the diagnosis works to individualise and pathologise women’s responses to sexual violence and gendered oppression – even if that is not the intention of psychiatrists and psychologists.

In his brilliant book, The Protest Psychosis, Jonathan Metzl analyses how the diagnosis of schizophrenia became to be associated with the figure of the angry, black male protester during the time of Civil Rights and black struggles in the US in the 1960s and early 1970s. Metzl shows how psychiatric diagnosis is infused with racialized and gendered assumptions, which shapes all aspects of the encounter between psychiatrist and patient, even if unconsciously. Psychiatric diagnosis, he argues, works to ‘define, circumscribe and contain abject populations’, such as ‘unruly housewives’, ‘addicted war veterans’, ‘inattentive children’ or ‘angry black men.’  At the level of what Metzl calls the ‘structural unconscious’, assumptions and fears about such groups shapes psychiatric perceptions and the way people are defined and diagnosed, even when psychiatrists and mental health workers are aiming to help.

Viewing mental health through a social framework is not to deny the agency and demands of those experiencing mental health difficulties.  On the contrary, as psychologist and psychiatric survivor Jay Watts wrote recently in an insightful article in the Guardian, ‘we must shift our focus to one that validates the lived experience of people who are suffering, however they choose to understand their pain. Some will choose to conceptualise their distress as an illness, others as a result of trauma others yet as an embodied response to the mixed messages that are rife in our society about who and how we are supposed to be.’

A social framework allows us to see how mental health is central to every aspect of our lives, and connected to all the battles we face – against racism and sexism, for sexual liberation, for decent housing, or in our struggles in the workplace against precarious work, or attempts to make us work longer and harder. Our struggle is alongside mental health workers, service users and others. Yes, to defend services when we have to, but also to envisage how we could conceptualise mental health in a liberatory way that doesn’t reduce us to our biological body or view us as units to be measured against happiness scales.